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COLLOQUIUM
EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION
THE following is an edited transcript of a Panel Discussion held at
the Fordham University School of Law on September 29, 1997.
At the time, the Bankruptcy reform movement had just begun to
gather momentum. The Responsible Borrower Protection Act
("RBPA") bill,' an attempt to transform the bankruptcy system into a
needs-based system, had just been introduced in Congress. For 1997,
personal bankruptcy filings increased by 20% to a record 1,350,118.2
Some spoke of a "crisis" in the bankruptcy system.3
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission, created in 1994, had
been holding hearings for over a year. In all, the Commission held
twenty-one national and regional hearings, which were attended by
over 2600 people over thirty-five days.' Ultimately, the Commission
was deeply divided. When the nine-member Commission issued its
final report on October 20, 1997, 5 it did so on a five-four vote. Judge
Edith H. Jones, Commission member and panelist in the discussion
below, wrote 255 pages in dissenting opinions.'
The report was immediately criticized by both debtor and creditor
groups.7 Moreover, representatives of consumer creditors began furi-
ously lobbying Congress "to ignore [the report's] contents and intro-
duce legislation at odds with the Commission's findings."' Indeed, the
RBPA was seen as a preemptive strike by the lending industry and its
1. H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997).
2. See American Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Statistics from the American Bank-
ruptcy Institute (visited Mar. 11, 1999) <http'J/ wv.abiworld.org/stats/stats.html>
[hereinafter American Bankr. Inst., Statistics] (collecting data from the Administra-
tive Office of U.S. Courts).
3. See, e.g., Gloomy Forecast, CardFAX, Oct. 28, 1997 ("The bankruptcy crisis is
going to get worse before it gets better." (remarks of Anthony E. Jennings, executive
vice president of AT&T Universal Card Services)), available in 1997 WL 11980656;
Bankruptcy Efforts "Worsen" Chargeoffs, Card News, Oct. 27, 1997 (referring to "our
nation's personal bankruptcy crisis" (quoting Rep. Bill McCollum)), available in 1997
WL 8787867; Judy Nichols, Plastic Blamed as Court Filings Rise, Ariz. Republic, Oct.
12,1997, at Al (referring to "this crisis in bankruptcies" (quoting John Erickson, pres-
ident of Consumer Credit Counseling Service Southwest)).
4. National Bankr. Review Comm'n, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years at ix
(1997) [hereinafter Report].
5. Report, supra note 4.
6. See Chairman's Note, in Report, supra note 4, ch. 5.
7. See, eg., Dean Foust & Debra Sparks, Bankruptcy Reform: Everybody's
Mad-And That's Fine, Bus. Wk., Nov. 3, 1997, at 154, 154 (quoting criticism from
both the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys and America's
Community Bankers).
8. Consumer Bankruptcy on Center Stage, Consumer Bankr. News, Nov. 20,
1997, at 1, 1; see also id. (observing that "[t]he lobbying has been incredible" (quoting
Rep. John Conyers, Jr.)).
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supporters in Congress against the Commission's recommendations.9
A Senate reform bill, the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1997,1° "ignore[d] the Commission's majority proposals."'"
In 1998, two more reform bills were introduced, 2 and eventually
reform legislation was approved by both houses of Congress. The pri-
mary feature of the approved bills was a needs-based approach to
bankruptcy. 3 The House and Senate disagreed, however, on how
means testing would work. The House version declared some debtors
ineligible for Chapter 7 relief and empowered creditors to seek dis-
missal of ineligible debtors' Chapter 7 petitions.'4 The Senate version,
on the other hand, required bankruptcy judges to consider a debtor's
ability to pay in determining whether to dismiss a debtor's case or
transfer it to Chapter 13.11 A Conference Committee ultimately com-
bined these two proposals, "adopt[ing] the procedural approach of the
Senate bill directing bankruptcy judges to consider repayment capac-
ity, while instructing that such repayment capacity shall be presumed
by the judge if the individual meets certain bright-line standards for
measuring such repayment capacity."' 6 The Conference bill was
passed by the House, but was not acted upon by the Senate before the
end of the 105th Congress.
The end of the 105th Congress, however, was not the end of the
bankruptcy reform movement. On February 25, 1999, Representative
George W. Gekas introduced the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999.17
The bill is identical to that which was reported by the Conference
Committee and approved by the House in the 105th Congress.' Op-
ponents of the bill have already begun to mobilize, 19 and the Clinton
9. See, e.g., Paul Weisman, Lenders Lobby for Reform of Bankruptcy, USA To-
day, Oct. 21, 1997, at 6A ("Banks, credit card companies and other lenders have
launched an all-out attack on a bankruptcy system they say coddles deadbeats....
Lenders are putting their muscle behind [the RBPA].").
10. S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1997).
11. Senator's Welcome Commission, Reject Report, Consumer Bankr. News, No-
vember 20, 1997, at 7, 7.
12. Consumer Lenders and Borrowers Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998,
H.R. 3146, 105th Cong. (1998); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th
Cong. (1998).
13. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-240, at 55-57 (1998) (discussing the bill's "needs-based"
reforms); S. Rep. No. 105-253, at 24-26 (1998) (discussing "needs-based bankruptcy").
14. H.R. Rep. No. 105-240, at 55.
15. S. Rep. No. 105-253, at 26.
16. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-794, at 121 (1998).
17. H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999); see also George W. Gekas, Bankruptcy Confer-
ence (visited Feb. 27, 1999) <http://www.house.gov/gekas/press/february/99/
bankconference.htm> (explaining Rep. Gekas's reasons for introducing the bill).
18. See American Bankr. Inst., Today's Bankruptcy Headlines (visited Feb. 25,
1999) <http://www.abiworld.org/headlines/99feb25.html> [hereinafter American
Bankr. Inst., Headlines]; Gekas, supra note 17.
19. See Jerrold Nadler, Press Release: Statement Regarding Bankruptcy Legisla-
tion in the 106th Congress (visited Feb. 27, 1999) <http://www.house.gov/nadler/
statmnts/sbnkrpt2.htm> (detailing Rep. Nadler's opposition to the bill).
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Administration is on record as threatening to veto the legislation.2"
Both proponents and opponents of needs-based bankruptcy are gird-
ing for a repeat of the political battle fought in 1998.
This year, though, the outcome may be different. The sense of "cri-
sis" in the bankruptcy system has lessened, and some of the direst
predictions of the credit industry2' have proven incorrect. In 1998, the
rate of growth in personal bankruptcy filings was only 3.5%, although
even that modest growth resulted in a record 1,398,182 filings.'
Moreover, there have been movements to promote debtor education
and to conduct additional, non-partisan studies of consumer bank-
ruptcy. In March 1998, Professor Karen Gross, one of our panelists,
launched the "Coalition for Consumer Bankruptcy Debtor Educa-
tion."'  In December, the American Bankruptcy Institute, a non-par-
tisan organization that takes no official position on bankruptcy
legislation, released a report by Professors Marianne B. Culhane and
Michaela M. White that found that only three percent of Chapter 7
filers have enough income to repay even twenty percent of their un-
secured debts over five years.24
Historically, the Bankruptcy Bar has had a profound impact on the
development and refinement of the Bankruptcy Code.' As the de-
bate over bankruptcy reform is joined, it is our hope that the bar will
once again make itself heard to ensure an approach that balances the
needs of debtors and creditors. The issues discussed by the Panel will
undoubtedly be the subject of heated debate throughout 1999 and be-
yond. We hope you find their discussion as entertaining and informa-
tive as we did.
20. See American Bankr. Inst., Headlines, supra note 18; Gekas, supra note 17.
21. See, eg., The Brighter Side of Bankruptcy, Credit Card Management, Nov. 1,
1997, at 10, 10 (reporting that Visa U.S.A. was predicting a 14.9% increase in bank-
ruptcy filings in 1998).
22. See American Bankr. Inst., Statistics, supra note 2, at 1.
23. See New York Law School, Prof Karen Gross Launches New Bankruptcy Ed-
ucation Coalition (visited Feb. 27, 1999) <http'J/www.nyls.edulmedia/releases/
330898.htm>.
24. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Means-Testing for Chapter 7
Debtors: Repayment Capacity Untapped? (visited Feb. 27, 1999) <http://
www.abiworld.org/research/creightonstudy.html>. The 20% figure was used by the
House in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998).
25. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of American
Bankruptcy Law, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 497 (1998).
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